The argument that democratization can bring about war is a powerful critique suggesting limits to the linkage between democracy and peace. This research examines this claim. Our findings demonstrate that democratizing polities are substantially less war prone than previously argued. By focusing on the characteristics of the transition process, we show that as contemporary polities become more democratic they reduce their overall chances of being involved in war by approximately 50%. We also find that rocky or especially rapid transitions or reversals are associated with a countervailing effect: namely, they increase the risk of being involved in warfare. Both in the long term and while societies undergo democratic change, the risks of war are reduced by democratization and exacerbated by reversals in the democratization process. To reach these conclusions, we developed and applied a logistic model linking authority characteristics and war involvement using Polity III and Correlates of War databases.
INTRODUCTION
Do polities become more peaceful as they democratize? Alternatively, is political change towards greater political democracy associated with increased likelihood of war? Research following Babst's (1964) observation of an apparent absence of a war between democracies has produced considerable empirical evidence for the liberal proposition (Kant 1975 (Kant [1991 ) that democracies rarely if ever fight each other (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Raknerud and Hegre 1997; Russett and Maoz 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Bremer 1992 Bremer ,1993 . Despite substantial variation and healthy debate over the specific causal mechanism linking joint democracy and peace, there appears to be an emerging, if heady, consensus at least on the empirical existence of a "democratic peace" or an absence of war among democracies. In April of 1995 (p. 18) The Economist summarized this by noting that "It takes two not to tango."
Research on the democratic peace has almost exclusively focused on the behavior of pairs of countries known as dyads. The dyadic character of the unit of analysis applies to the issue of conflict (i.e., are the societies involved in a war with each other), but also to the major independent forces often employed to explain the conflict. The dyad is typically classified as being jointly democratic, mixed, or jointly autocratic. Some studies have also used measures of the mean or average level of political democracy in a dyad.
1 When the analysis has rested at this constructed dyadic level, the results have been consistent and have cumulated into what has become known as the democratic peace proposition. † Forthcoming, American Political Science Review, 1998, Volume 92, No. 1. However, when the unit of analysis is focused on the monadic level of individual states, most studies have failed to find strong or significant differences between the war participation of democracies and non-democracies. While this conclusion has been questioned in some writings (Rummel 1983 (Rummel , 1985 (Rummel , & 1995 Ray 1995a,b; Hewitt and Wilkenfeld 1996) , the conventional wisdom is that while democracies do not fight each other, they appear to be at least as war-prone as other political systems (see e.g. Singer and Small 1976; Russett and Maoz 1993; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Dixon 1993 Dixon , 1994 ; although see also Gates, Knutsen, and Moses 1996) . Why there is such a divergence between the national and bilateral versions of the idea that democracy leads to more peaceful foreign policies continues to be puzzling. One early study suggested that ethnocentrism was at part to blame (Chan 1984) . A recent critique (Spiro 1994) suggested that the first finding is simply a result of having a very rare set of occurrences to study: unusual (i.e., rare) events involving rare structures (democracies) are especially rare. The issue of whether it is useful to aggregate conflict initiators and targets into a single dyad at war is also viewed as problematic. The probability of participating in a war may also depend upon the number of politically relevant dyads a country is involved with Lemke 1995) as well as the regime characteristics of the other countries in these dyads. Relevant dyads are those where there exists an actual opportunity for war, typically gauged by geographical proximity and/or the density of political interactions.
The conundrum of why democracies apparently do not wage wars against one another but are not in general more pacific has failed to spawn a great deal of research. Thompson and Tucker (1997) note that in the past decade there have been over one hundred empirical papers targeted at the peaceful joint democracy proposition. On the other hand, a much smaller number of scholars have looked into why democracies are not considered sui generis to be more pacific.
2 Small and Singer (1976) found there was no difference between democracies and autocracies in the baseline probability of war involvement. Chan's research (1984) also demonstrated this empirical regularity. Both of the two major explanations of the democratic peace proposition, the normative and institutional, would seem to have broader implications for the putative peaceful nature of the modern polity. Why this conundrum is so important is not only that it calls into question the theoretical underpinnings of the democratic peace hypothesis, but also may undercut the idealist policy prescription shared by diverse political leaders; namely, that widespread democratization will lead to widespread peace.
In this light, recent evidence has emerged that seeks -in part -to reconcile the differences between the bilateral and state-centric versions of Kant's long-standing (1975 Kant's long-standing ( [1991 ) thesis. Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b; 1997) suggested that while democracies may eventually become more peaceful than autocratic societies, the transition phase in which a state is newly democratic is especially dangerous. Nascent democracies are thought to be quite likely to become involved in foreign conflict. This is a consequence of the fragile position of the new elite, forced to appeal to nationalistic forces in attempts to solidify its tenacious positions. Accordingly, this leads to an increased propensity for war involvement. This may help explain the divergent empirical findings. If democracies are truly more peaceful, except during their very early stages of democratic institutionalization, the non-pacific nature of democracies might be the result of war proneness in young democracies balanced by the pacific behavior patterns of mature democracies.
On the other hand, the notion that democratizing societies are war prone and conflict laden does call into question whether democracies do in general have norms and institutions that prohibit conflict with other (similar) societies. This, in turn, raises the question of whether in an era of widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, democratization will always be easily adjudged a good thing. The absence of a strong monadic link between democracy and peace would not necessarily disprove the dyadic proposition that democracies rarely if ever fight each other. Nor, would its presence put to rest all questions about the validity of the democratic peace. Yet, information about the form and nature of any monadic link would get us closer to answers to these questions. These ambiguities between different levels of analysis suggest that existing research on the democratic peace proposition may have left unexplored some possible implications of domestic political structure for conflict behavior.
In this research, we examine in some detail the monadic aspects of the democratic peace proposition by revisiting the question of whether democratizing states are less war prone than autocratic states. Our focus is upon the process of how exactly states become more or less democratically governed. We probe whether this may help to explain why democracies do not appear to be very likely to wage war with other democracies. In focusing on transitions, we follow the suggestion of Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b) that non-mature democracies undergoing rapid change in institutional arrangements may be more prone to war involvement. We do not systematically examine simultaneous factors that might resolve the differing relationships between political structure and conflict behavior found on the various levels of analysis. We ignore the characteristics of other societies. Neither do we address the issue of the actual timing of changes of political or institutional arrangements and structures, something unexplored in the extant data on regime characteristics. Instead, we focus on another set of neglected features of domestic political structure with possible implications for conflict behavior; namely, the effects of political transitions and regime change.
In short, we re-examine whether states that are democratizing are more war prone. We also examine whether reversals of the democratization process tend to threaten peace.
THE DANGER OF DEMOCRATIZATION
Many studies of the democratic peace examine the impact of current domestic political structures on war participation.
3 Explanations of the democratic peace focus either on the existence of norms that facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Dixon 1993 (Dixon , 1994 Raymond 1994; Hewitt and Wilkenfeld 1996) or the structural features of democracies that make decision-makers more cautious in the use of force (Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) . These include both formal institutional constraints on the executive decision to declare war, as well as various electoral mechanisms that enhance the dependence of executive leaders on popular approval.
The existence of contested elections increases the executive leader's sensitivity to political risks since it may call into question the tenure of the ruling authorities. The fear that failure may lead to loss of political power in subsequent elections will ensure more restraints in the use of force. In the same way, legislative approval will be an important source of constraint on political leaders. Bueno de Mesquita and and construct a simple theory based on coalition theory (i.e., Riker, 1962 ) that illustrates these points. They show that democrats are punished more quickly than autocrats for losing wars. Consequently, in the presence of uncertainty about the outcome of a conflict, they are more likely to press for compromise.
The distinction between these two, competing views is commonly portrayed as a difference between structural and normative explanations of the democratic peace. However, as illustrated in Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (N.d.) the distinctions may be subsumed under a broader theory of what motivates democratic as well as autocratic decision-makers.
Many who accept the notion that democracies do not fight each other still consider democratization and political change something of a double-edged sword. While stable, well-established democracies may not fight each other, a possibly rocky process of democratization or transition towards a fragile democracy need not necessarily imply that countries become immediately more peaceful. Indeed, as shown in Lichbach (1984) , a smooth transition from low levels of democracy to high levels of democratic governance is the exception, not the rule. Classic sequences from monarchy, through concurrent democratic and autocratic rule, to an overwhelmingly democratic political structure are considered to be "historical rarities" (Lichbach, 1984, 77) . A full thirty-percent of the historical European seems to oscillate between democratic and non-democratic forms of governance, according to Lichbach's study.
The degree of democratic commitment or time since democratization may be important for explanations emphasizing the rôle of norms as well as institutions. It is quite plausible that some time may have to pass before democratic norms or informal institutions become sufficiently well established to have the effect of inhibiting conflicts. Some have suggested employing a turnover or two consecutive elections as classification criteria for democracy (Ray 1995a,b and Huntington 1991) . This perspective calls into question whether one should expect to find a decreasing likelihood of war attendant to democratic transitions.
Yet, much stronger and more pessimistic claims have been made with respect to the impact of democratization on the likelihood of conflict and war. Political instability and change in general is often considered to be associated with increased likelihood of conflict and with possible subsequent escalation and war involvement. Rapid democratization might bring about weak regimes unable to establish effective control and political order. While these new regimes may be less repressive and permit greater political freedom than their precursors, they would also be prone to instability and attempts by challenging groups intent on seizing political power. Political instability and disorder might even encourage attacks from other countries. Stable, autocratic regimes in fact might be less prone to conflict and escalation to war than regimes in transition. In the same way, political leaders might become more dependent on popular support in democratizing regimes and young democracies. Absent fully established institutions and civic traditions, these societies are often considered prone to populist pressures emphasizing the short-term maximization of political support. Democratization often comes bundled with nationalism. In some cases certain groups, typically ethnic minorities, become targeted as second-class citizens and made scapegoats for existing problems. According to some observers, the transition towards democracy in the former Communist Countries in Eastern Europe has left the population "free to hate". In such circumstances, war often enjoys widespread support among the population. The invasion of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands initially boosted the popularity of the fledgling and increasingly unpopular Argentinean military regime. Populist politicians in young and struggling democracies might subsequently come to employ external aggression as a way of enhancing political support. The republics of former Yugoslavia provide another example, where increased political freedom and external aggression seem to have gone hand in hand. 4 The above discussion suggests two competing hypotheses on the effect of democratization on the likelihood of war. Fortunately, these are non-nested and evidence can be collected on each of them at the same time. However, our belief is that the dangers of democratization are less likely to be borne out in the analysis. Why? Primarily, we think that there is a logical, if not necessarily empirical, inconsistency in accounting for the evidence on the democratic peace proposition while at the same time maintaining that democratizing states are war prone. If transitions to democracy were dangerous, newly institutionalizing states would come to rely more on warfare in their foreign policies precisely because decision-makers will have relied on international violence during an important evolutionary period of their development. That reliance will have served their internal political purposes, both in terms of retention of power but also in terms of how the institutions and norms were initially shaped. If warfare comes to be evolutionarily dominant and successful in states undergoing the process of democratization, it would seem likely that the institutions and norms would emerge in a way to reflect this. Evidence of a general (i.e., non-dyadic) trend of pacific relations in democracies would help to explain why democracies do not appear to wage war with one another. If, however, democracies -even nascent ones -are more belligerent, this raises some considerable doubt about the logical status of a democratic peace. This explains perhaps the great interest in the recent work of Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b) by scholars working in the area of democratic peace. Thompson and Tucker (1997) detail a number of potential weaknesses in the Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b) research design, and in one replication conclude that "regime change and war involvement are independent" (p. 450). Similarly, Enterline (1996) found that democratization has a "negative impact on the likelihood of a state being on the initiating side of a dispute" (p. 197). These studies used slightly different case selection, variable definition, and statistical methods in coming to the three differing conclusions. Existing studies of this notion are first efforts, and do not yet present the accumulated, supporting replications that would befit sweeping generalizations. It is clear that more studies are needed and that the current state of the art findings on this question seem especially fragile.
We are also persuaded that both norms and institutions may be said to produce greater caution in democrats than in autocrats. Because of swift and almost certain penalties for foreign policy failures in democracies, democratic leaders are likely to be more cautious in the face of uncertainty. In representative forms of democracy, where legislatures must be brought on board prior to foreign policy initiatives, there is an additional pressure for cautious, slow decision-making that avoids conflict when faced with uncertainty. Empirical evidence is quite clear that even victories in war rarely enhance a leader's prospect of prolonging tenure (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992) . The incentives for war involvement are thus generally lower in democratic than non-democratic countries. However, what is unclear is whether these pressures are muddled in the process of democratic (or autocratic) change.
Our research seeks to gain more information about this question by directly posing it in terms of the process of regime change. Three aspects of regime change command our attention. First, we want to know the direction of the change, in terms of whether it is toward or away from a greater level of democratic institutionalization. We are also interested in the rapidity and amount of change. Has the change been small, or have the modifications in the structure of governance been huge ones. Change from a monarchy to direct presidential elections by universal adult suffrage will be consequential, whereas the change from suppressed to restricted political participation may be less important. Finally, it is useful to know whether the change has been smooth, or variegated. Since we know from Lichbach's (1984) study that smooth, linear change from autocratic to democratic forms of government is historically rare, it is important to know whether some oscillation is in place, or whether frequent reversals are evident. For, if the dangerous democratization argument is correct, it is especially in such situations where one would expect to find warprone democracies.
We formulate this as a probability problem: are states in the process of transition, especially democracies, more likely to be involved in interstate wars? We choose to model this problem as logistic probability equation. We choose this form because it allows us to make reasonable statements about the probabilities of war behavior associated with certain trajectories of democratic changes. These allow a more direct and accessible model to be developed that can be applied to a dependent variable that is binary, such as war involvement. Basically, we want to know the probability of a polity being involved in an interstate war at a given point in time based on its authority characteristics and how they have changed over the prior ten year period. This is expressed as a logistic equation:
, where W i denotes conflict involvement, represents the authority characteristics (i.e., ∈ {Democracy, Democracy minus Autocracy, Executive Constraints} and superscripts { d, m, v } refer respectively to the direction (the absolute value of the change over the prior ten years), magnitude (the actual change over the prior ten years), and variance (over the prior ten years) of change in the authority characteristics ( for i= democracy, democracy minus autocracy, and executive constraints; these individual components are defined in Table 1 ). The probability of war for a given observation has the following logistic form This simple model is quite different in some respects from most other efforts. First, our choice of independent variables focuses entirely on the transition process. Many other studies include only changes exceeding some specific magnitude or have used dichotomous categories (i.e., change versus no-change) over some period. These categorizations of political change risk being arbitrary. The mere existence of change is not by itself an adequate measure of democratization. Unlike those who conceive of democracy as an "all-or-nothing" affair, we think of democratization and political change as movements (though not necessarily smooth movements) along a continuum and examine the amount, direction, and variance of change along that continuum.
We believe that greater changes towards democracy will be associated with a decreasing likelihood of war, while minor steps towards greater political democracy and cosmetic changes should exercise less effect on the avoidance of war. Political change or processes of democratization can however take many different forms and need not proceed in a unidirectional or linear fashion. Much of the literature on democratization has claimed that large or rapid change towards democracy often tends to be associated with greater instability and higher risk of democratic reversals (e.g. Huntington 1984 Huntington , 1991 . These views seem to imply that gradual changes involve a smaller likelihood of war than rapid democratization. Furthermore, greater variability of political change within a country's political system would be associated with higher likelihood of war. Accordingly, we focus on the moments of the distribution of change in authority characteristics, including the direction, magnitude, and variance of change, along with the actual current values.
Such a specification is novel in this literature, but allows us to glean more details about the democratization process and how, if at all, it relates to the probability of being involved in a war. Unstable democratic transitions would exhibit a high degree of variance in their democratization scores. Countries moving quickly would exhibit a large value for the magnitude of change, but slow democratizing societies would exhibit a small magnitude of change, with low variance, over time. The next section describes the data, methods, and results from an empirical examination of the issue of whether democratization increases the risk of war.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
For assessing authority characteristics, we employ the 5.1996 version of the Polity III database (Jaggers and Gurr 1996) . A more complete description of these data may be found in Gleditsch and Ward (1997) , Gurr (1974) , Moore (1989, 1990) , and Jaggers and Gurr (1995) . These data are more up-to-date that those available previously, having information on polities through the 1994 period. In addition, a number of important revisions have been undertaken in this version of the data. These are detailed in the web site that supports the data (http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/Data/Polity.html). Most important among the changes in this version are the corrected democracy scores of 19 th Century Monarchies and the inclusion of transition codes. Table 1 shows in tabular format the coding rules for assigning democracy and autocracy scale values in the Polity III framework. Table 2 provides the definitions for each of the independent variables constructed from these values and employed in equation (1).
From these data and definitions we are able to calculate democracy scale values {D }; democracy scale values minus autocracy scale values { D-A }; the extent of executive constraints on the executive decision maker {C }; and the direction-coded positively for movements toward democracy-and magnitude of change as well as the variance over the prior ten years in the above three variables, represented respectively by d, m, and v superscripts.
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Two available databases address a similar spatial and temporal frame for war and conflict among nations: the International War Data [COW-IW] (Singer and Small 1994, also described in Small and Singer 1982) and the Militarized Interstate Dispute [COW-MID version 2.0] database (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996) . Both of these are associated with the Correlates of War project and cover the same time span. Yet, there are substantial differences between these two databases. The COW-IW encompasses data on interstate wars among member states in the international system as well as extra-systemic wars among member states of the international system and extra-systemic organizations or movements. Such conflicts with more than 1000 battle deaths are classified as wars. The extra-systemic category largely consists of colonial and/or imperial wars. The COW-MID data are more inclusive, focusing on "cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property or territory of another state" (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996:168) . This excludes extrasystemic wars. Mansfield and Snyder (1995a,b; 1997) analyzed the democratization and war hypothesis via an inclusion of extra-systemic wars, based on the underlying rationale that nationalist aggression and diversionary use of force may lead to involvement in imperial and colonial wars outside the state system. Since wars are relatively rare events, many analysts have examined the relationships between regime characteristics and conflict involvement at levels of conflict well below the threshold of 1000 battle deaths. However, the issue of whether available theories would pertain to weaker forms of conflict is disputed (Chan 1997; Gochman 1996; Enterline 1996) . The COW-MID database is considered by some to be more up-to-date and reliable than the COW-IV database. The theoretical criteria for inclusion are the same and except for some minor revisions, analysts should expect the two databases to have nearly identical entries (excepting the exclusion of extra-systemic events). No codebook is yet available for the COW-MID database, but a recent article (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; 171) quotes the Small and Singer (1982) criterion of 1000 battle deaths as a threshold for interstate war. We have not found the similarities between the two databases to be overwhelming. There are many, important differences. Some nation-waryears found in COW-IW are not found in COW-MID (e.g., France in 1942-43). Some nation-war-years in COW-IW are classified as "display of force" in COW-MID (e.g., China and Vietnam in 1985, Italy in 1912, and Kuwait in 1991, among others). As many as 185 (nation-) war-years in COW-MID are not found in COW-IW. Small and Singer (1982, 55) make certain restrictions for individual country involvement to qualify as being "at war." Specifically, a member state must either suffer a minimum of 100 fatalities or have a minimum of 1,000 armed personnel engage in active combat. Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) do not mention this issue, but COW-MID includes a separate coding of the specific level of hostility a given country's dispute involvement has reached. Excluding cases of participation at a level below interstate war reduces the discrepancies to 92 war-years. The major share of these seem to stem from different starting years, with the COW-MID typically assigning a more comprehensive coding. COW-MID, for example, has the duration of the Mexican-American war as 1843-1848 compared to 1846-1848 for COW-IW. 7 This information could be mined to help reduce the discrepancies, however, there are 162 conflict-years in COW-MID without country specific involvement values.
We use the Correlates of War International War database for this study since it is more conservative in coding war involvement -our main dependent variable -and because it includes extra-systemic wars which are especially pertinent to the hypothesis of the dangers of democratization, though we also report results from the COW-MID database where appropriate. Thus, we have used the most recent version of the Correlates of War database to ascertain whether each polity was involved in an interstate or extra-systemic war during each year from 1815-1992. We call this variable war involvement, denoted {W }. The Correlates of War project defines an interstate war as violent conflict between two or more members of the international system involving at least 1,000 annual battle deaths. The extra-systemic wars are conflicts involving territories or groups outside the state system, a category largely comprised by colonial wars. We have coded countries as being at war in years in which they were classified by the Correlates of War database (Singer and Small, 1994 ) as parties to one or more interstate or extra-systemic wars. 8 Data from the Polity III (May 1996 version) and the Correlates of War databases were merged to provide annual observations on each independent polity over the period from 1815-1992. We estimate the model given in equation (1) with these data. 9 Table 3 portrays the results of two logit estimations of the equation [1] . These results suggest that the direction, the magnitude of change, and the variance of change are important in determining the log-odds of a polity being at war. Focusing first on the democracy scale and democracy minus autocracy results (which are substantively equivalent), we find that the current level is not especially important, but that the direction and magnitude of change are both strongly related to the log-odds of being at war, yet these two effects are of opposite sign.
10 Changes toward greater democratization are associated with significantly greater log-odds of war involvement, a finding consistent with the dangerous democratization thesis put forward by Mansfield and Snyder (1996a,b) and others. However, the actual magnitude of that change is also important as a predictor of war involvement with larger changes toward democracy associated with smaller probabilities of war involvement. It is the former result that is consistent with the findings of Mansfield and Snyder (1996a,b; 1997) , but the latter is not. If one focuses only on whether a change occurs or not, changes toward democratization may appear to enhance Source: Empirical Estimates in Table 3 , above. the probability of war involvement. However, examining the effects of the extent of those changes, reveals that the probability of war involvement is reduced. Averaging these two effects, might-in some studies-lead to the conclusion that there is no effect, a finding reported in Thompson and Tucker (1997a,b) . However, it seems important to look at the cumulative, integrated effect of the direction, magnitude, and variance of change on the probability of war. Examining the logit results independently may be misleading since these three variables do not vary independently, but are mathematically related. For example, if there is no change over a decade, the magnitude of change is zero, as is the variance. Although many possible combinations of these variables are possible, the variables are not completely independent. Moreover, these log-odds ratios are not especially easy to interpret in substantive terms, though they are positively related to the probability of war involvement.
What does this really mean about the probability of being at war? We present these results in terms of probabilities. Rather than present another table of these results, we calculate the probabilities for the dependent variable as a function of some scenario involving the independent variables. These scenarios preserve the mathematical relationships among these independent variables. We examine the process of democratization and construct scenarios in which there is a transition of the authority characteristics over a ten-year period. We look at democratization as well as "reversal". We present these results graphically in Figure 1 . Figure 1 displays the estimates of the probability of war involvement for various combinations of the independent variables. This yields the marginal changes in probabilities for changes in the underlying process.
As this figure details, democratization-whether toward mild or strong democratic degrees of government-is accompanied by reduction, not increase, in the risk of war. Though we do not present these graphs, changes towards autocracy and reversals are accompanied by increased risks of war involvement. These increases are proportionally greater than the decline or benefits of further democratization. These results provide strong evidence of a monadic effect of the process of democratization: it reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a war. Although the probability of war involvement does not decrease linearly, it does decrease monotonically so that over the entire range of democracy minus autocracy values, there is about a fifty-percent reduction. During the democratic transition, at every point along the way, as well as at the end points, there is an attendant reduction in the probability of a polity being at war.
We also find that reversals toward greater levels of autocracy (not shown) not only increase the probability of war involvement, but also the reversals result in a higher level of risk. Apparently, it is more dangerous to be at a given level of democracy if that represents an increase in the level of authoritarianism than it is to be at the same level of democracy if that represents a decrease in the authoritarian character of the regime. Stated differently, reversals are riskier than progress.
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It has been argued that institutional constraints are theoretically important in translating the effect of democracy into foreign policy (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Siverson 1995) . If we break the idea of democracy into its major component parts, it has been shown that the degree of executive constraints empirically dominate the democracy and autocracy scales (Gleditsch and Ward 1997) . Accordingly, we demonstrate that moving toward stronger executive constraints also yields a visible reduction in the risk of war. Table 4 portrays the empirical results from estimating the basic model using the executive constraints variables on the right hand side of equation (1).
These results are largely consonant with those found for the democracy and democracy minus autocracy scales presented in Table 3 (above). However, the results for the degree of executive constraints are much stronger in two aspects. First, the overall model is more statistically distinct, with a probability of type II error at least one order of magnitude smaller (Likelihood ratio χ 2 = 21.89, p = .000). More importantly, the direction of change variable is not significant, but all other variables in the model are strongly significant. The current value of executive constraints is shown to put upward pressure on the log-odds of being involved in war, while the magnitude of change toward greater executive constraints dampens the probability of war involvement. As in the case for the democracy minus autocracy scale, the variance is strongly significant and has the effect of substantially increasing the likelihood that a polity will be at war.
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These results are also suggestive that Mansfield and Snyder may not have got the story completely right, but they didn't completely miss the boat, either. Democratic change, in particular increases in constraints on chief executives, has a compound and confounding effect. Rocky changes toward democracy (or autocracy, for that matter) do appear to increase the likelihood of war involvement. Yet, sui generis, changes toward greater democracy via increased executive constraints appear to reduce the risk of war. Note: These results are based on the executive constraints variable defined in Table 1 . The range for the variable is [1, 7] The total effect of these forces is displayed graphically in Figure 2 which illustrates that if a polity moves from having no constraints on the executive decision-maker (i.e., a value of 1.0 on the x-axis in Figure 2 ) to a position of parity or subordination with the legislature (a value of 7.0 on the executive constraints scale), the probability of being involved in an interstate war is reduced by a third from about 9% to about 6%. This sheds light on what exactly it is about democratization that may reduce the probability of war: shared power between the executive and legislature, each largely staffed by officials pressured by public opinion. To the extent that changes toward democracy bring with them constraints on the executive branch of government, the attendant reduction in the risk of war appears quite robust.
How does the smoothness of the transition toward democracy or autocracy affect these conclusions? We find that transitions marked by periods of substantial changes toward and away from democracy are marked by an increased risk of war. Smooth transitions on the other hand tend to be associated with considerably lower risks of war. Figure 3 shows these results based on empirical estimates from Table 2, using the democracy minus autocracy scale. Democratic countries with the highest variance in their authority characteristics over time have a risk of war approximately twice that of democracies without much variance in their authority characteristics. 13 This temporal investigation of the scope and extent of regime change allows us to understand two sets of competing findings. On the one hand, as countries become more democratic, other Source: Empirical Estimates in Table 4 , above.
things being equal, they become more peaceful. On the other, if the transitions are not smooth and exhibit progress as well as setbacks on the "road to democracy", then they are more likely to be involved in warfare along the way. It does not appear to be the rapidity of change toward democracy that is at issue, it is the linearity of the process. Smooth monotonic transitions toward democracy have the least risk and greatest benefit associated with them. Reversals, even short term ones, have the greatest risk. Prior analyses that did not focus on the process of transition did not discover these nuances.
CONCLUSION
Our results show that the process of democratization is accompanied by a decrease in the probability of being involved in a war, either as a target or as initiator. These results were obtained with a more up-to-date (and corrected) database than has been used in earlier studies of this question. Our analyses also focused more clearly on the process of transition than earlier studies. In comparison to studies that looked only at the existence of change in authority characteristics, we looked at the direction, the magnitude, and the smoothness of the transition process. Source: Empirical Estimates in Table 3 , above.
However, it is necessary to temper these results. First, we have focused on aspects of the transition process to the exclusion of other important aspects of domestic and international politics that may affect the probability of being at war. We do not suggest to have presented a complete model of this process. Although our model passes conventional statistical muster, it should not be used as a predictive model of war. We can correctly predict over 90 percent of the correct outcomes, but all of our correct predictions are for the absence of war, the mode. Cases in which there was a war are rare, of course, and the predicted probabilities associated with these cases are higher than in other cases, but do not approach the 0.50 level that would be a minimum for predicting the presence of a war.
14 Further, we recognize that both space and time offer potent threats to these results. Our logistic analyses can not rule out temporal or spatial effects that may outweigh the linkages we found between democratization and the propensity for war involvement. We know from other studies that both war involvement and democratization exhibit temporal, as well as spatial, patterns that are not random. Statistical techniques for separating these effects and controlling for them in logistic models are not available. Indeed, it is necessary to first transform the problem into a survival analysis with a spatial component in order to address these concerns more directly. This serves as a point of departure for future research, but serves as a weakness in the current study.
Moreover, we understand that having focused on the monadic aspects of changes in regime characteristics ignores the strongest findings of the democratic peace literature. As a result we have ignored the potentially powerful hypotheses that expose the effects of joint democracy, common interests and alliances, the balance of capabilities, and of economic interdependence and international commerce. Nor do we investigate the spatial aspects of these relationships to ascertain whether contiguity and common spatial relationships are important. However, by focusing on the transition argument alone, we lose any traction that might be gained from these notions as well. In the same way, by focusing on democratization processes, we avoid generalizing about the causes of war. All of these aspects are undoubtedly important, and each of them is receiving considerable attention in the literature. Our purpose here is not to bring any evidence to bear on these ideas. Instead, we focus on the issue of whether democratizing states are more war prone than other states.
In spite of these limitations, this study makes a valuable contribution to what is known about the linkages between democratization and conflict processes. In this limited way, we find evidence of a heightened propensity for war involvement in certain democratizations and a diminished likelihood of being in a war in others. Our analysis shows how the dangerous democratization thesis may be modified to be more consistent with the data analysis. In particular, there are aspects of democratization that appear to increase the likelihood of war, as initially suggested by Gagnon (1994/5) and followed up on by Mansfield and Snyder (1996a,b; 1997) . At the same time, it is also the case that the broad and overall effect of democratization promotes peace.
Strong images support the notion of a dangerous democratization. One such image at the time of this writing is that of an incapacitated Russian leader faced with a welter of nationalist competition inside Russia. The small bandage placed over the gaping wound in Grozny may be perceived as a opportunity that motivates a democratic consolidation. The conflict in the Balkans is often offered as stylized evidence that democratization is not only fragile but also dangerous. Recent events in Eastern and Central Europe after the breakup of the Yugoslavia and the Soviet Empire have spawned considerable speculation about the dangers of democratization (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a,b) . Typical examples offered are Serbia (Yugoslavia), Croatia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, while these regimes may enjoy considerable popular support, it seems dubious whether they might be accurately characterized as democracies. 15 These countries did not exist as countries prior to 1991 and it is hard to say how democratization-even if it is underway-can be separated from the process of state building and institutionalization. It is appropriate to question whether these examples are typical at all. 16 Many conflicts in the area have been predicted that have failed as yet to materialize (e.g., Hungary versus Romania, Russia versus the Ukraine, Poland versus Lithuania, Russia versus the Baltic Republics). Even the stylized facts are quite complicated and do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that newly emergent democracies are war prone. Not every political change is toward greater institutionalization of democratic norms and practices.
The democratic peace hypothesis has maintained that democracies do not go to war against other democracies. The dangerous democratization hypothesis has suggested that emergent democracies may be quite prone to international violence, largely because of "deformed" institutional forces. Our research does not rule out such an outcome, but it does demonstrate that overall the process of democratization proceeds in a way to reduce the risk of war. It also shows that there is little statistical evidence to suggest that the transition of a state toward more democratic practices renders the state more dangerous as a threat to international peace unless that transition is rocky and involves reversals along the way. Thus, it appears that the safest conclusion that can be reached from these analyses is that democratic reversals increase the likelihood of warfare. involvement on the monadic level can be ambiguous. A country may be classified as participating in a war while its own involvement remains low and few or no casualties occur. Alliance commitments with the warring societies may lead countries to declare war while they themselves do not enter the active conflict. Other countries might be involved in conflict and suffer more battle-related deaths, but not be classified as being at war if the overall level of violence does not reach the 1,000 threshold. 9 We use SPLUS™ version 3.4 running on a SUN™ SPARC™ 5 running Solaris™ 2.4 for the analysis reported in this article; these results have been replicated using LIMDEP™ 7.0 running under MS-DOS™ 6.0and SPLUS™ for Windows version 3.3.
10 Based on these results and equation [1] prototypic democracies that do not change over a ten-year period, for example, have a probability of being at war of 0.07 while prototypic autocracies have a corresponding probability of 0.08. This underscores the relative unimportance of the current regime characteristics. However, it should be pointed out that the model was developed to assess the importance of changes in regime characteristics.
11 Recent work by Rousseau et al. (1996) has questioned the appropriateness of using summed measures of dyadic behavior such as war involvement for testing possible monadic effects of authority structures, and holds that a crucial distinction must be made between the use of force in response to aggression from another party and the initiation of force against the opponent. While we find the problem of identifying the initiator to a conflict troublesome-especially so if it comes in the context of long-term, protracted conflicts-supplementary tests for effects of democratization on the initiation of war may nevertheless provide additional evidence for evaluating the conclusions from our previous findings. We find that the likelihood of war initiation is reduced by over 75% as countries move from a prototypic autocracy to a prototypic democracy, and becomes less than 1% as polities reach higher values on the democracy minus autocracy scale. 12 We find virtually identical results for the analysis of war initiation with executive constraints. 13 Examples include Argentina during the 1970s and 1980s, Guatemala during the 1960s, Austria prior to the start of the Second World War, Nigeria in the 1980s, and both Greece and Turkey during the post-1945 era.
14 However, the highest estimated probabilities are generally associated with cases in which there was a war involvement. 15 Armenia is coded in the POLITY III data as having a democracy score of seven for the years 1991-94, and would meet the oft-used criteria of a democracy score of at least six. The other countries are scored as follows; Croatia (1991 Croatia ( &1992: 5, 1993 Croatia ( & 1994 , Serbia/Yugoslavia (1991 & 1992 : 2, 1993 , Azerbaijan (1991 Azerbaijan ( : 3, 1992 Azerbaijan ( : 2, 1993 Azerbaijan ( & 1994 . Note also that Serbia/Yugoslavia and Azerbaijan receive very high scores on the POLITY III autocracy scale for the years 1993 and 1994 (values of six and eight respectively). 16 In their reply to Thompson and Tucker (1997) in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Mansfield and Snyder (1997) list a number of cases where they believe their model applies, including among others, Rwanda in the 1990s. It seems dubious whether these cases are consistent with their hypothesis that democratization and not autocratization may lead to war. It is hard to see how Rwanda can be classified as a democratizing regime. Many forms of political instability can be identified-domestic conflict, political violence, labor unrest-that might induce external conflict, but a regime loosing control does not necessarily constitute democratization.
